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AMBRO, 
ABC Corp., John Doe 1, and John Doe 2 are subjects 
of an ongoing grand jury investigation into an alleged 
criminal tax scheme.
Circuit Judge 
1
When ABC Corp. objected that the Government had 
improperly served a subpoena for documents on ABC Corp., 
the Government issued grand jury subpoenas for those 
documents to ABC Corp.’s current outside counsel—
LaCheen, Wittels & Greenberg, LLP, and Blank Rome, LLP.  
Later, it also served subpoenas for documents and testimony 
on three attorneys formerly employed by ABC Corp. as in-
house counsel.  In each instance, the firms and counsel 
asserted attorney-client and work product privileges on ABC 
Corp.’s behalf, the Government moved to enforce the 
subpoenas, and ABC Corp. opposed the motion as the 
purported privilege holder.   
  As part of that scheme, ABC Corp., 
under the direction of John Doe 1 and John Doe 2, purchased 
and subsequently sold numerous companies.  These 
consolidated appeals concern whether documents and 
testimony relating to legal advice obtained by ABC Corp. in 
connection with these transactions are shielded by the 
attorney-client and work product privileges.   
                                              
1 We use pseudonyms to refer to the grand jury subjects to 
protect the secrecy of the grand jury investigation and the 
anonymity of the subjects. 
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The District Court granted the Government’s motions 
to enforce based in part on the crime-fraud exception, which 
permits the Government to obtain access to otherwise 
privileged communications and work product when they are 
used in furtherance of an ongoing or future crime.  Finding 
that the requested communications and work product either 
did not qualify as privileged or that any protection afforded 
was vitiated by this exception, the Court largely rejected ABC 
Corp.’s privilege claims and issued corresponding disclosure 
orders—the first directed to ABC Corp., LaCheen Wittels, 
and Blank Rome in March 2012 (the “March Order”), and the 
second directed to the three in-house counsel in June 2012 
(the “June Order”).   
ABC Corp. seeks to appeal these Orders.2
                                              
2 John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 also seek to appeal.  Because we 
conclude they lack standing to do so, see infra Part II, we 
dismiss their appeals. 
  Disclosure 
orders are not normally immediately appealable final 
decisions.  To obtain immediate appellate review, a privilege 
holder must disobey the court’s order, be held in contempt, 
and then appeal the contempt order.  That has not happened 
here.  ABC Corp. argues nonetheless that it can appeal under 
an exception to the contempt rule established in Perlman v. 
United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918).  Under Perlman, a privilege 
holder may immediately appeal an adverse disclosure order 
when the traditional contempt route is unavailable to it 
because the privileged information is controlled by a 
disinterested third party who is likely to disclose that 
information rather than be held in contempt for the sake of an 
immediate appeal.  
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We disagree that we have jurisdiction to hear ABC 
Corp.’s appeal from the March Order.3  It directs both ABC 
Corp. and the law firms to produce the withheld documents.  
While Blank Rome is in physical possession of them, it is 
holding them at the behest of ABC Corp.  If ABC Corp. 
wants immediate appellate review, it can take possession of 
the documents, defy the disclosure Order, and appeal any 
resulting contempt sanctions.4
We agree, however, that we have jurisdiction to hear 
ABC Corp.’s appeal from the June Order, which is directed 
solely to its former in-house counsel.  ABC Corp. cannot be 
held in contempt of this Order because it does not direct ABC 
Corp. to take or refrain from any action.  And there is no 
indication that ABC Corp.’s former employees are anything 
but disinterested third parties unwilling to be held in contempt 
to vindicate its purported privilege.  We therefore reach the 
merits of ABC Corp.’s appeal from the June Order. 
  Because it has not yet taken 
these steps, we dismiss its appeal from the March Order for 
lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
                                              
3 We previously issued an opinion and judgment on May 24, 
2012, dismissing the appeal of the March Order for lack of 
jurisdiction.  Although we continue to dismiss the appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction, we vacate that opinion to avoid any 
confusion—particularly with respect to our dicta in that 
opinion regarding a recent Supreme Court case, Mohawk 
Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 130 S. Ct. 599 
(2009). 
4 As we explain below, if the parties cannot agree on how to 
transfer the documents, the District Court should impose a 
suitable method of transfer. 
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ABC Corp. alleges a series of problems with that 
Order: (1) the Court applied the wrong standard of proof in 
determining whether the Government made a sufficient 
showing to support application of the crime-fraud exception; 
(2) no matter the proof required, the Court wrongly found that 
the Government satisfied its burden; (3) the Court erred in 
applying the crime-fraud exception to work product generated 
by the in-house counsel because there is no suggestion these 
attorneys were involved in the alleged criminal scheme; and 
(4) with respect to five particular documents, the Court ruled 
incorrectly that they either did not qualify as privileged or 
were subject to the crime-fraud exception. 
 We sympathize with the difficult position of ABC 
Corp.’s attorneys.  They are arguing against the applicability 
of the crime-fraud exception without knowledge of the 
underlying evidence for that exception.  Because this 
evidence would reveal aspects of the grand jury’s 
investigation and thus cannot be made public, the District 
Court filed its March and June Orders under seal and 
provided only redacted copies to the parties.  See Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 6(e)(2).  Though we limit our discussion to 
background facts already disclosed to both parties in order to 
maintain this secrecy, we have received and closely reviewed 
unredacted versions of the Orders, as well as secret grand jury 
information submitted ex parte by the Government.5
                                              
5 Though we only have jurisdiction to hear ABC Corp.’s 
appeal of the District Court’s June Order, we review the 
Court’s crime-fraud findings from its March Order to the 
extent they formed the basis for its June Order. 
  On the 
basis of that review, we affirm the District Court’s June 
Order. 
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I. Background 
A. 
ABC Corp., John Doe 1, and John Doe 2 are subjects 
of an ongoing grand jury investigation that seeks to determine 
whether they and others undertook fraudulent business 
transactions in order to evade federal income taxes.  ABC 
Corp. is an administratively “dissolved” corporation.  It was 
formed in early 2004 and it ceased business operations in late 
2005.  John Doe 1 was the company’s President and sole 
(though indirect) shareholder.  John Doe 2, who was also 
affiliated with the company, is his son.   
The Alleged Criminal Scheme 
During ABC Corp.’s existence, it acquired companies 
with large cash accounts, few or no tangible assets, and 
considerable tax liabilities.  ABC Corp. would transfer these 
target companies to two limited liability companies.  
According to the Government, shortly thereafter the limited 
liability companies would engage in various transactions that 
had the effect of fraudulently eliminating the target 
companies’ tax liabilities.  Having done so, John Doe 1 and 
John Doe 2 would then divert the target companies’ cash 
assets to themselves and their family members. 
B. 
In December 2010, the grand jury issued a subpoena to 
ABC Corp.’s former vice president of corporate acquisitions 
as the company’s custodian of records.  The subpoena sought 
all records relating to transactions and business dealings 
between ABC Corp. and specific entities, including the two 
limited liability companies implicated in the alleged criminal 
scheme.  At some time the Government received access to, or 
copies of, ABC Corp. documents from a law firm that 
previously represented the company.  The firm withheld 
The District Court’s March Order   
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documents that ABC Corp. claimed were privileged but did 
not supply the Government with a privilege log.   
ABC Corp. subsequently changed representation.  
LaCheen Wittels now represents ABC Corp. and John Doe 1, 
while Blank Rome represents John Doe 2.  As is often the 
case, the grand jury subjects have a joint-defense agreement 
in place.   
Following this change in representation, the documents 
that had been held by ABC Corp.’s former outside counsel 
were transferred to Blank Rome.  The documents were 
transferred to Blank Rome rather than Lacheen Wittels 
because, according to ABC Corp., LaCheen Wittels does not 
have sufficient space to store the documents.  After the 
documents were transferred, ABC Corp. provided the 
Government with a privilege log in April 2011 for the 
documents it was withholding.  Despite previously producing 
documents and providing this privilege log, ABC Corp. for 
the first time also took the position that the Government had 
not effectively served the subpoena on its former vice 
president.   
To address any problems arising from its alleged 
service error, the Government served grand jury subpoenas on 
LaCheen Wittels and Blank Rome.  The subpoenas sought all 
documents relating to ABC Corp. that Blank Rome received 
from ABC Corp.’s former outside counsel.  In response to 
these subpoenas, Blank Rome produced approximately 24 
boxes of documents.  It continued to withhold, however, the 
documents listed in the April 2011 privilege log, and ABC 
Corp. provided the Government with another privilege log in 
June 2011 for additional documents withheld. 
Thereafter the Government filed a motion to enforce 
the subpoenas, requesting that ABC Corp., Blank Rome, and 
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LaCheen Wittels be required to disclose 171 of the 303 
documents identified in the privilege logs.  It argued that even 
if the documents were otherwise entitled to protection under 
the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, the 
crime-fraud exception wipes away that protection. 
The March Order directed ABC Corp., Blank Rome, 
and LaCheen Wittels to produce 167 of the 171 requested 
documents.  The District Court concluded that the crime-
fraud exception barred ABC Corp.’s privilege and work 
product claims.  It did not resolve whether the Government 
had properly served ABC Corp. 
Five days later, ABC Corp., John Doe 1, John Doe 2 
filed a timely notice of appeal and a motion for a stay of the 
District Court’s order pending appeal.  We granted the stay 
and expedited the appeal.6
In May 2012, we issued an opinion and judgment 
dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because ABC 
Corp. could receive immediate appellate review by taking 
possession of the documents, refusing to produce them, and 
then appealing any contempt sanctions imposed by the 
District Court.  We left it to ABC Corp., the Government, and 
   
                                              
6 ABC Corp. had previously attempted another Perlman 
appeal in this matter.  See In re Grand Jury Matter #4, No. 
11-4105 (3d Cir. Dec. 20, 2011) (dismissing summarily for 
lack of jurisdiction).  According to ABC Corp., the 
documents at issue in that appeal had already been turned 
over to and reviewed by the Government by the time the 
panel issued its order.  Here, in contrast, the documents are 
not in the Government’s possession and the Government has 
not reviewed them. 
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the District Court to select a procedure for transferring the 
documents from Blank Rome to ABC Corp. if it still wished 
to pursue a contempt appeal.  
Shortly after our May 2012 order issued, the parties 
had a conference call with Judge Bartle to discuss how to 
transfer the documents from Blank Rome to ABC Corp.  
Following that call, Blank Rome sent a letter to the 
Government proposing two potential mechanisms for 
permitting ABC Corp. to seek appellate review following a 
contempt sanction: (1) Blank Rome could transfer possession 
of the privileged documents to the Clerk of the Court, who 
would hold the documents until ABC Corp. either decided not 
to be held in contempt or until after final appellate review; or 
(2) the Government could stipulate that even if the documents 
remained in the physical possession of Blank Rome, they are 
being held by that firm as an agent for ABC Corp.  Under 
either scenario, if ABC Corp. decided to refuse to comply 
with the disclosure order, only it would be subject to 
contempt sanctions. 
The Government, in a letter dated May 30, 2012, 
rejected both of these proposals “because they provide no 
avenue for a meaningful contempt sanction.”  It also noted its 
belief that the law firms could still be held in contempt for not 
producing the documents if the parties could not come to an 
agreement on how to transfer the documents.  
After we granted its motion to lift the stay in this case 
on June 5, 2012, the Government sent a letter to Judge Bartle 
enclosing a proposed order outlining a procedure for 
transferring the documents.  If entered, it would require Blank 
Rome either to (1) appear in court and produce the documents 
at issue to the Government or (2) appear in court and produce 
documents to a representative of ABC Corp. who was willing 
and authorized to (a) accept service on behalf of ABC Corp., 
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(b) take custody of and maintain the transferred documents 
until produced to the Government, and (c) suffer significant 
contempt sanctions.  The District Court was unable to act on 
the proposed order, however, because we reinstated the stay 
on June 6, 2012. 
ABC Corp., John Doe 1, and John Doe 2 subsequently 
filed a petition for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc.  We 
granted the petition for a panel rehearing to revisit, in light of 
the developments on remand, our holding that we lacked 
jurisdiction under Perlman to hear this appeal.     
C. 
In  December 2011 grand jury subpoenas were issued 
to three attorneys formerly employed by ABC Corp. as in-
house counsel.  Each of the attorneys received two subpoenas, 
one seeking testimony and documents from that attorney in 
his or her individual capacity and one seeking documents and 
testimony from him or her as a custodian of records for ABC 
Corp.   
The District Court’s June Order 
In response to these subpoenas, the attorneys withheld 
45 documents and refused to testify as to certain matters on 
the grounds that the information sought is shielded from 
production by the attorney-client privilege and the work 
product doctrine.7
                                              
7 One of the attorneys did not withhold any documents as 
privileged because she claims not to have any documents 
responsive to the subpoena. 
  When the Government subsequently filed 
a motion to enforce the subpoenas, ABC Corp., who 
successfully intervened to contest the subpoena, opposed that 
motion on the same grounds. 
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The June Order reaffirmed the District Court’s prior 
crime-fraud ruling.  The Court required the in-house counsel 
to produce 11 of the 45 withheld documents, finding that they 
were either not privileged at all or that any privilege was 
vitiated by the crime-fraud exception.  It also instructed the 
attorneys to testify about transactions involving the target 
companies that ABC Corp. ultimately sold to the two limited 
liability companies implicated in the alleged criminal scheme. 
ABC Corp., John Doe 1, and John Doe 2 subsequently 
filed a notice of appeal and the District Court granted a stay 
of their order pending appeal.  We consolidated the appeals of 
the District Court’s March and June Orders. 
II. Standing 
Although the Government does not challenge 
Appellants’ standing, we are obliged to address it sua sponte.  
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 (1990) 
(quoting Anthony v. Council, 316 F.3d 412, 416 (3d Cir. 
2003)).  A person has standing to challenge a grand jury 
subpoena issued to another when he has a “sufficiently 
important, legally-cognizable interest[] in the materials or 
testimony sought.”  In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 1073 
(3d Cir. 1997) (collecting cases).  ABC Corp. has standing to 
challenge the grand jury subpoenas because it claims 
attorney-client and work product privileges in the documents 
and testimony at issue.  Id.8
                                              
8 ABC Corp. also has standing to challenge the March Order 
because one of the subpoenas challenged was issued to it. 
  John Doe 1 and John Doe 2, in 
contrast, do not hold any privilege in the sought-after 
documents or testimony and have not asserted any other 
interest in them.  They therefore lacked standing to oppose 
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the Government’s motion to enforce the subpoenas,9
III. Jurisdiction 
 and do 
not have standing to appeal the District Court’s resulting 
Orders. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  Although our jurisdiction is in dispute, we have the 
jurisdiction to decide that dispute.  Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 
F.3d 88, 94 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006). 
A. 
“[T]he right to a judgment from more than one court is 
a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of justice . . . 
.”  Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).  
Congress has bestowed this grace by granting the courts of 
appeals jurisdiction over “final decisions” of the district 
courts.  28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Whether a decision is “final” 
depends on its effects.  Marcus v. Twp. of Abington, 38 F.3d 
1367, 1370 (3d Cir. 1994).  “Ordinarily, a final decision will 
have two effects.  First, the decision will fully resolve all 
claims presented to the district court.  Second, after the 
decision has been issued, there will be nothing further for the 
district court to do.”  Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer East, 
Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 557 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Catlin v. United 
States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). 
Finality and the Contempt Rule 
                                              
9 Although the District Court permitted them to respond to the 
Government’s motions to enforce, John Doe 1 and John Doe 
2, unlike ABC Corp., never formally moved to intervene in 
the action, and the Court did not discuss whether they had a 
legally cognizable interest.   
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When a district court orders a witness—whether a 
party to an underlying litigation, a subject or target of a grand 
jury investigation, or a complete stranger to the 
proceedings—to testify or produce documents, its order 
generally is not considered an immediately appealable “final 
decision[]” under § 1291.  See United States v. Ryan, 402 
U.S. 530, 532–34 (1971); Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 326–29; 
Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 118–22 (1906).  It 
is well settled that a witness who “seeks to present an 
objection to a discovery order immediately to a court of 
appeals must refuse compliance, be held in contempt, and 
then appeal the contempt order.”  Church of Scientology of 
Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992) (citing Ryan, 
402 U.S. 430); see also Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 326–29; 
Alexander, 201 U.S. at 118–22; DeMasi v. Weiss, 669 F.2d 
114, 121–23 (3d Cir. 1982).  A district court’s contempt order 
is itself immediately appealable because it is a final judgment 
imposing penalties on the willfully disobedient witness in 
what is effectively a separate proceeding.   
The contempt route to an immediately appealable final 
decision is a firmly established feature of federal appellate 
procedure, stretching back to at least the Supreme Court’s 
1906 decision in Alexander, but the decision to travel that 
route must not be made lightly.  The Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the 
necessity for expedition in the 
administration of the criminal law 
justifies putting one who seeks to 
resist the production of desired 
information to a choice between 
compliance with a trial court’s 
order to produce prior to any 
review of that order, and 
resistance to that order with the 
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concomitant possibility of an 
adjudication of contempt if his 
claims are rejected on appeal. 
Ryan, 402 U.S. at 533 (citations omitted).  The rule, “though 
at times a harsh one, was formulated to discourage appeals in 
all but the most serious cases.”  In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 800 (3d Cir. 1979).  Requiring a 
person who objects to a disclosure order to “refuse to comply, 
be subjected to sanctions in contempt, and then appeal from 
the sanctions . . . [,] puts the objecting person’s sincerity to 
the test by attaching a price to the demand for immediate 
review.”  Wilson v. O’Brien, 621 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 
2010).  It forces the objector to weigh carefully the likelihood 
of success of its challenge to the underlying disclosure order 
against the seriousness of the sanctions it would face—
whether incarceration, a hefty monetary fine, or some other 
penalty—if it disobeys the order to disclose.  It also forces the 
objector to assess the importance it attaches to avoiding the 
ordered disclosure and protecting any associated privileges. 
B. 
In Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), the 
Supreme Court carved out an exception to the rule that a 
privilege holder must stand in contempt of a disclosure order 
before an immediate appeal may be taken.   
The Perlman Exception to the Contempt Rule 
Louis Perlman testified on behalf of his company in a 
patent infringement suit in District Court.  Id. at 8.  When the 
company moved to dismiss its suit without prejudice, the 
District Court granted the company’s motion, but it ordered 
the court clerk to impound the exhibits Perlman used during 
his testimony and to maintain them under seal.  Id. at 8–9.   
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Soon after, the Government began a grand jury 
investigation of Perlman, suspecting him of perjury during his 
prior testimony.  Id. at 11–12.  To assist in the investigation, 
the Government sought an order from the District Court 
directing the court clerk to produce the exhibits Perlman used 
during his testimony.  Id. at 9–10.  Perlman objected, 
claiming that use of the exhibits as a basis for indictment 
against him would be an unreasonable search and seizure and 
would make him a compulsory witness against himself in 
violation of the Constitution’s Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  
Id. at 10, 13.  The District Court rejected Perlman’s challenge 
and ordered the clerk to produce the exhibits to the 
Government.  Id. at 10–11. 
When Perlman ultimately appealed to the Supreme 
Court, which heard the case under its then-obligatory 
appellate jurisdiction, the Government argued that the District 
Court’s disclosure order was not appealable.  Id. at 12.  The 
Supreme Court disagreed, saying only that 
[t]he second contention of the 
government is somewhat strange, 
that is, that the order granted upon 
its solicitation was not final as to 
Perlman but interlocutory in a 
proceeding not yet brought and 
depending upon it to be brought. 
In other words, that Perlman was 
powerless to avert the mischief of 
the order but must accept its 
incidence and seek a remedy at 
some other time and in some other 
way.  We are unable to concur. 
Id. at 12–13. 
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Though the Perlman doctrine’s reach has not been set 
precisely by the Supreme Court, it generally permits an 
interlocutory appeal of a disclosure order if it is directed at a 
disinterested third party lacking a sufficient stake in the 
proceeding to risk contempt by refusing compliance.  See 
Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 18 n.11; United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691 (1974).10
                                              
10 For example, in Perlman the clerk of the court presumably 
lacked any stake in Perlman’s grand jury proceedings to risk 
contempt by refusing to comply with the subpoena.  See Nat’l 
Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 591 F.2d 
174, 179 (2d Cir. 1979) (“In fact it was not only ‘unlikely’ 
but unimaginable.” (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683, 691 (1974)).   
  In that circumstance, the 
privilege holder is allowed to appeal immediately without 
suffering contempt sanctions because the privilege holder 
cannot itself disobey the disclosure order and the third party 
to whom the disclosure order is directed is unlikely to do so 
on its behalf.  See In re Grand Jury Empanelled Aug. 14, 
1979, 638 F.2d 1235, 1237 (3d Cir. 1981) (explaining that the 
privilege holder in Perlman and its progeny “were not the 
targets of the subpoena itself, which meant that the contempt 
route for obtaining an appeal was not available to them”); In 
re Grand Jury Applicants, 619 F.2d 1022, 1025 (3d Cir. 
1980) (explaining that “the Alexander-Cobbledick-Ryan 
[contempt] rule restricting appellate review is limited to 
situations where the contempt route to a final order is 
available to the appellant”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 
604 F.2d at 800–01 (permitting Perlman appeal where the 
disclosure order adverse to the attorney-client privilege was 
not directed to the privilege holder); In re Air Crash at Belle 
Harbor, N.Y. on Nov. 12, 2001, 490 F.3d 99, 105–06 (2d Cir. 
2007); Wilson, 621 F.3d at 642–43; In re Motor Fuel 
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Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 641 F.3d 470, 485–86 
(10th Cir. 2011). 
C. 
In addition to contempt and Perlman appeals, some 
courts permitted privilege holders to take immediate appeals 
of adverse privilege determinations if they could satisfy the 
requirements of the collateral order doctrine.  The doctrine, 
first announced in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 
337 U.S. 541 (1949), provides that there is a small class of 
collateral rulings that, although they do not terminate the 
litigation, are appropriately deemed final under § 1291.  Id. at 
545–46.  “That small category includes only decisions [1] that 
are conclusive, [2] that resolve important questions separate 
from the merits, and [3] that are effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.”  
Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 45 (1995).   
Mohawk and its Effect on Perlman 
In Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 
130 S. Ct. 599 (2009), however, the Supreme Court held that 
disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege do 
not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order 
doctrine.  Focusing exclusively on the third requirement of 
the collateral order doctrine, the Mohawk Court held that 
“collateral order appeals are not necessary to ensure effective 
review of orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege” 
where the privilege holder is a party to the litigation because 
“postjudgment appeals generally suffice to protect the rights 
of litigants and assure the vitality of the attorney-client 
privilege.”  Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 606.  “Appellate courts can 
remedy the improper disclosure of privileged material in the 
same way they remedy a host of other erroneous evidentiary 
rulings:  by vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for 
a new trial in which the protected material and its fruits are 
excluded from evidence.”  Id. at 606–07. 
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The Government argues that this decision narrows the 
traditionally understood scope of the Perlman doctrine to 
instances where effective postjudgment review is unavailable.  
Deciding whether Mohawk precludes our jurisdiction in this 
case—where the privilege holder, ABC Corp., is a subject of 
a grand jury investigation—prompts two distinct inquiries.   
The first is whether Mohawk, which dealt with the 
collateral order doctrine, applies to the Perlman rule at all.  
Other courts of appeals—see Holt-Orsted v. City of Dickson, 
641 F.3d 230, 236–40 (6th Cir. 2011); United States. v. 
Krane, 625 F.3d 568, 572–73 (9th Cir. 2010); Wilson, 621 
F.3d at 642–43—have concluded that the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Mohawk about the effective reviewability of 
disclosure orders that would break the attorney-client 
privilege applies equally to Perlman so long as the privilege 
holder is a party to an underlying litigation.  When that is the 
case, those claims can be reviewed effectively postjudgment, 
making immediate appeals unnecessary.  
Assuming Mohawk narrows Perlman at all, the second 
inquiry is whether this reasoning extends to prohibit Perlman 
appeals from grand jury investigations.  An order requiring 
the disclosure of privileged materials arguably is as 
effectively reviewable, absent an immediate appeal, for 
subjects of a grand jury investigation as it is for parties in 
civil litigation.  If the grand jury’s investigation leads to an 
indictment and later a conviction, we can remedy an 
“improper disclosure of privileged material . . . by vacating 
the adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial in which 
the protected material and its fruits are excluded from 
evidence.”  Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 606–07.  Of course, this 
may not always be the case.  A subject of a grand jury 
investigation may not actually have an opportunity for post-
conviction review of a disclosure order; he may never be 
indicted, the charges may be dismissed, or he may be 
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acquitted.  The same is often true in civil litigation, however.  
After an unfavorable privilege ruling, a civil litigant may 
nonetheless settle, obtain summary judgment, or win a 
favorable verdict, leaving the privilege broken and the 
District Court’s ruling unchallenged.   
Regardless, we decline to hold that the Supreme Court 
narrowed the Perlman doctrine—at least in the grand jury 
context—sub silentio.  See Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 
236, 252–53 (1998) (“Our decisions remain binding 
precedent until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless of 
whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their 
continuing vitality.”); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a precedent of 
this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest 
on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court 
of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, 
leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own 
decisions.”).  Perlman himself sought to prevent the 
disclosure of documents to a grand jury that was conducting 
an investigation into whether he committed perjury in a patent 
infringement action.  The Supreme Court has not 
subsequently suggested that Perlman’s status as a grand jury 
subject would today deny him immediate appellate review 
and the Mohawk Court gave no clear indication that this was a 
consequence of its intended holding.  It did not discuss, 
mention, or even cite Perlman, a fact that is not that 
surprising given that the Perlman doctrine and the collateral 
order doctrine recognize separate exceptions to the general 
rule of finality under § 1291.  See Krane, 625 F.3d at 572.11
                                              
11 The Mohawk Court surveyed other appellate options 
available to aggrieved privilege holders, and indicated that, 
when confronted with an adverse decision from the district 
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The Government argues that we should nonetheless 
hold that the Mohawk Court narrowed Perlman because 
“Mohawk’s description of the final-judgment rule relied on . . 
. precedent regarding what it means for an order to be 
effectively ‘final,’ and this precedent indisputably includes 
Perlman.”  Government’s Br. at 26 (Aug. 31, 2012).  The 
Government cites Ryan for its statement that all appeals under 
§ 1291—which includes both collateral order and Perlman 
appeals—should be limited to “cases where denial of 
immediate review would render impossible any review 
whatsoever of an individual’s claims.”  402 U.S. at 533; see 
also Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 328 (noting that the “analysis of 
finality” applied in Cobbledick is “illustrated” by Perlman).  
In the same passage of Ryan, however, the Court described 
Perlman—a case where the privilege holder was a grand jury 
subject—as satisfying the finality requirement.  402 U.S. at 
533. 
We cannot say that the Supreme Court has abandoned 
that determination on the basis of a later case, Mohawk, that 
never cites, let alone discusses, Perlman.  If and when that 
Court next hears a case involving the Perlman doctrine, it 
may well hold that the doctrine does not allow grand jury 
subjects to receive immediate appellate review of adverse 
privilege determinations.  And, given the need for judicial 
efficiency in the criminal context, such a decision may be 
                                                                                                     
court, a party in a civil proceeding can still receive an 
immediate appeal via the contempt route.  130 S. Ct. at 607–
08.  This may indicate that the Perlman doctrine, which can 
be seen as an exception to the normal rule requiring a 
privilege holder to be held in contempt to appeal 
interlocutory, remains in place where the holder is a civil 
litigant or grand jury subject. 
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justifiable.  We will not, however, intrude on the Supreme 
Court’s prerogative to make that determination.  We therefore 
conclude that the Perlman exception remains viable. 
D. 
We dismiss ABC Corp.’s appeal of the District Court’s 
March Order because the contempt route remains open to it.  
It is subject to a Court Order to produce the documents.  
Although the documents are in the physical possession of 
Blank Rome, they are ABC Corp.’s documents and are under 
its legal control.
Jurisdiction over Appeal from the District Court’s 
March Order  
12  See In re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d 946, 951 
(3d Cir. 1987) (“A party’s lack of possession or legal control 
over documents requested by a subpoena is normally a valid 
defense to a subpoena and justification for a motion to 
quash.”); In re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (“The test for the production of documents is 
control, not location.”).  ABC Corp. is responsible for 
deciding whether to produce or withhold the documents, and 
could properly be held in contempt for directing the law firms 
to withhold them.13
                                              
12 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) permits a court to 
“quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be 
unreasonable or oppressive.”  Whatever else Rule 17(c) 
requires, it would not be unreasonable or oppressive to 
require a witness to produce documents within his legal 
control simply because those documents are in the physical 
possession of another. 
   
13 ABC Corp. asserts that the District Court’s order 
erroneously included ABC Corp. because the Government 
never properly served the company with a subpoena and, in 
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The situation is complicated because the Court’s Order 
is also directed at ABC Corp.’s outside counsel, exposing 
them to potential contempt sanctions if they do not comply 
with it.14
                                                                                                     
any event, ABC Corp. does not have custody of the 
documents.  This argument misses the mark.  An order does 
not become immediately appealable simply because a 
putative appellant believes that it is, in one way or another, 
wrong or improper.  If ABC Corp. believes that the District 
Court’s order is reversible for whatever reason—whether 
because it was not preceded by proper service of a subpoena, 
because it was the result of an improper crime-fraud ruling, or 
for any other reason—and it wishes to present its challenge in 
an immediate appeal, it must disobey the order and take the 
contempt route.  Until it is vacated, the District Court’s 
order—not the grand jury’s subpoena—binds the company 
and compels production of the documents.  See Brown v. 
United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959) (“A grand jury is 
clothed with great independence in many areas, but it remains 
an appendage of the court, powerless to perform its 
investigative function without the court’s aid, because 
powerless itself to compel the testimony of witnesses.”), 
overruled on other grounds by Harris v. United States, 382 
U.S. 162, 167 (1965). 
  We recognize that production of the documents by 
14 Judge Vanaskie agrees that we lack jurisdiction to review 
the March Order to the extent it requires production directly 
by ABC Corp. because it may obtain appellate jurisdiction by 
refusing to produce the contested documents and standing in 
contempt.  He dissents from this section of our Opinion, 
however, because he believes we have jurisdiction over the 
Order to the extent it requires the law firms to produce the 
documents.  This approach, we believe, bifurcates the Order 
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the law firms, despite an instruction from ABC Corp. to 
withhold them, might as a practical matter avert any need for 
the Government to seek contempt sanctions against ABC 
Corp.  When we first heard oral argument in this case, the 
Government, in an attempt to address this concern, indicated 
that it would not seek contempt sanctions against the law 
firms if the documents were transferred from Blank Rome to 
ABC Corp.’s possession.  We agreed that this course of 
action would take care of our concern, and instructed ABC 
Corp., the Government, and the District Court to resolve a 
plan for transferring the documents.   
Unfortunately, piecemeal consensus dissolved to 
dissonance.  ABC Corp. and the Government were unable to 
agree on a mechanism to transfer the documents.  While ABC 
Corp. believes it sufficient for Blank Rome to transfer the 
documents generally to the possession of ABC Corp., the 
Government believes any resulting contempt sanctions 
against ABC Corp. in that circumstance would be 
meaningless because the company is defunct.  Instead, the 
Government wants the documents to be transferred to a 
designated representative of the company who is personally 
willing to suffer significant contempt sanctions.   
According to ABC Corp., this inability to agree 
indicates we were wrong that the contempt route remains 
                                                                                                     
and emphasizes too technical an understanding of our 
jurisdiction.  Both Judge Vanaskie and we agree that ABC 
Corp. legally controls the documents and may be held in 
contempt for refusing to produce them.  Unlike Judge 
Vanaskie, however, we see the law firms’ choice whether to 
follow their client’s directions or be held in contempt as a 
resolvable practical problem, not a basis for our jurisdiction. 
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open to it.  That the parties were unable to resolve this dispute 
amicably, however, does not mean that the contempt route is 
foreclosed.  The District Court—which was previously 
hamstrung due to our imposition of a stay of its March 
Order—is no doubt capable of resolving this dispute for the 
parties.   
We now lift the stay to free the Court to resolve this 
matter.  If ABC Corp. continues to want to pursue a contempt 
appeal, the Court should determine an appropriate mechanism 
for transferring the documents from Blank Rome to ABC 
Corp.  While we do not dictate what contempt sanctions the 
Court imposes or how the documents are transferred, it 
should effect a transfer that permits it to impose sanctions 
sufficient to put ABC Corp.’s “sincerity to the test” in 
determining whether to pursue the contempt route.  In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d at 800; see also Wilson, 
621 F.3d at 643. 
This may mean, as the Government requests, that the 
documents are transferred to a representative of ABC Corp. 
rather than into its general possession.  In the normal course, 
a court can impose sanctions, including monetary fines and 
incarceration, against a disobedient corporate entity or any 
corporate officer responsible for the corporation’s refusal to 
obey.  See Carol A. Jones, 10A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5069 
(Thomas Reuters 2011); Reich v. Sea Sprite Boat Co., Inc., 64 
F.3d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1995); Elec. Workers Pension Trust 
Fund of local Union #58 v. Gary’s Elec. Serv. Co., 340 F.3d 
373, 382 (6th Cir. 2003); NLRB v. Maine Caterers, Inc., 732 
F.2d 689, 691 (1st Cir. 1984).  If ABC Corp., as a defunct 
corporation, is nothing more than a ghost without officers or 
property, these normally effective sanctions may be 
meaningless.  Accordingly, the Court may, in its discretion, 
designate a representative of ABC Corp. to receive delivery 
of the documents or require ABC Corp. to do so.  
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ABC Corp. argues that “[t]here is no one who is ready, 
willing, or able, under these circumstances, to receive the 
documents and suffer incarceration to vindicate the privilege 
rights of [ABC Corp.]”  Appellants’ Br. at 32 (Aug. 17, 
2012).  This proves too much.  Corporations act through and 
are controlled by individuals.  There must be some person or 
persons directing ABC Corp. to assert privilege over the 
withheld documents.  If those person(s) are unwilling to 
suffer contempt sanctions, this only points out that the 
privilege holder has weighed its chances of success on appeal 
against the seriousness of the sanctions it will face for 
disobeying the District Court’s Order, and determined that it 
is unwise to seek immediate appeal.   
We stress that if the documents are transferred 
pursuant to court order (or an eleventh hour agreement 
between the parties), the law firms—absent bad faith 
dealings—should not be the target of any sanctions.  We are 
confident that the Government, consistent with its 
representations to us, will not seek to hold the law firms in 
contempt in that event.  And no doubt the District Court 
appreciates this difficult predicament.15
                                              
15 ABC Corp. contends that the Government’s position 
ignores the seriousness of a grand jury subpoena and court 
order, and that the law firms could be charged with 
obstruction of justice by engaging in behavior intended to 
thwart the grand jury’s investigation.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1503 
(obstruction of grand jury investigation).  These concerns are 
understandable, but, we believe, unfounded.  It would not be 
obstruction of justice, as the Government conceded at oral 
argument, if Blank Rome transfers the documents to ABC 
Corp.—after giving the Government and the District Court 
sufficient notice of the time, place, and other circumstances of 
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ABC Corp. cautions that refusing to hear this appeal 
would “essentially destroy[] the Perlman doctrine” because 
“Perlman can now be defeated if the government or another 
litigant simply names the privilege holder in the motion to 
compel and includes the privilege holder in the compulsion 
order, even where the privilege holder is not in possession of 
the subpoenaed documents.”  Appellants’ Br. at 36.  This 
concern is overstated.  Our reasoning would only prevent an 
appeal where a privilege holder subject to a disclosure order 
retains legal control of the documents that are in the physical 
possession of another and the Government has agreed that the 
documents can be transferred to the privilege holder without 
the transferor risking contempt.16
                                                                                                     
the transfer—so that the company can go down the well-
established path of disobeying a disclosure order, suffering 
contempt, and then appealing any contempt sanctions.  Of 
course, this is not a license for Blank Rome to send the 
documents out of the jurisdiction or to act with bad faith in 
any way when transferring the documents to ABC Corp.   
  Although the Government 
may be wise in the future to avoid these complications by 
issuing a subpoena only to the privilege holder, the contempt 
16 Several courts of appeals permit Perlman appeals where the 
disclosure order is directed solely at the privilege holder’s 
attorney.  In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 123 F.3d 695, 698-
700 (1st Cir. 1997) (collecting cases).  These cases are 
properly distinguished because their disclosure orders were 
not also directed at the privilege holder, making it effectively 
impossible for the holder to be held in contempt.  These cases 
often concern as well the production of subpoenaed 
documents (e.g., law firm records) that are legally controlled 
by the firm rather than the client.  See, e.g., In re Klein, 776 
F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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route remains open in this instance and there is no need for us 
to allow a Perlman appeal.    
E. 
We do, however, have jurisdiction to hear ABC 
Corp.’s appeal of the District Court’s June Order.  The 
contempt route is not open to ABC Corp. because the 
subpoena and subsequent Order were directed solely at the 
three former ABC Corp. in-house attorneys.  There is also no 
basis to believe that these former employees are anything but 
disinterested third parties who are unlikely to stand in 
contempt to vindicate ABC Corp.’s alleged privilege.  
Recognizing these facts, the Government does not argue that 
the contempt route remains open to ABC Corp., relying 
instead on its argument that Mohawk precludes a privilege 
holder who is a grand jury subject from appealing under 
Perlman.  As explained above, we decline to hold that 
Mohawk so narrows Perlman.  Accordingly, we reach the 
merits of this appeal with one exception. 
Jurisdiction over Appeal from the District Court’s June 
Order 
In its June Order, the District Court rejected ABC 
Corp.’s request to issue an order requiring the Government to 
allow ABC Corp. to preview the questions that the 
Government intended to ask the in-house counsel before the 
grand jury.  ABC Corp. does not argue that the District 
Court’s refusal to allow it to preview these questions—a 
ruling based primarily on the Court’s determination that there 
was no compelling necessity to justify breaking the seal of 
secrecy normally afforded to grand jury investigations—is 
independently appealable prior to a final decision on the 
merits.  Instead, it asks us to consider this ruling in the course 
of deciding its substantive privilege claims on the theory that 
its inability to preview the questions prevented it from 
effectively defending its privileges. 
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ABC Corp. has not cited, and we have not found, any 
case where we have considered this sort of ancillary due 
process issue in the course of hearing substantive privilege 
claims on a Perlman appeal.  We have, to be sure, previously 
considered other procedural issues—such as whether a district 
court erred in refusing to order the Government to disclose its 
ex parte affidavit supporting application of the crime-fraud 
exception, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d 213, 219 (3d 
Cir. 2000), and whether a district court erred in holding a 
hearing ex parte to determine the reasonableness of a 
subpoena, In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 144–45 (3d Cir. 
1997)—in the course of deciding a Perlman appeal.  These 
procedural questions, however, were closely tied to the 
substantive issues raised on appeal.  They concerned the 
disclosure of evidence underlying the challenged district court 
ruling or the method employed to test the sufficiency of that 
evidence.  The question presented here—whether ABC 
Corp.’s defense of its privilege was hindered by being denied 
the opportunity to preview grand jury questions—is 
significantly more tangential to the substantive privilege 
issues resolved by the District Court.17
                                              
17 To the extent ABC Corp. is arguing that the District Court 
erred in choosing not to evaluate ABC Corp.’s privilege 
claims on a question-by-question basis—an issue over which 
we would have jurisdiction because it goes to the District 
Court’s reasoning in evaluating the challenged privilege 
ruling—we are unconvinced that the Court erred.  It engaged 
in a detailed analysis of the crime-fraud exception and 
whether it applied to the witnesses’ testimony.  Although 
courts often analyze privilege issues on a question-by-
question basis, there is no support for ABC Corp.’s 
suggestion that the Court’s analysis was somehow deficient 
solely because it chose not to do so. 
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As the Supreme Court reiterated in Mohawk, Congress 
has shown a preference that the appealability of decisions 
under § 1291 be determined through the rulemaking process 
rather than through court decision.  Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 
609  “Specifically, Congress in 1990 amended the Rules 
Enabling Act to authorize th[e] [Supreme] Court to adopt 
rules defin[ing] when a ruling of a district court is final for 
the purposes of appeal under section 1291. . . .  These 
provisions . . . warrant the Judiciary’s full respect.”  Id. 
(alteration omitted) (quotation marks and citations omitted).   
Because we derive our jurisdiction from Congress’s 
exercise of its authority to “ordain and establish” inferior 
courts, U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1, we are obliged to defer to 
Congress in this context.  In addition, declining to expand our 
jurisdiction through court decision reflects an understanding 
of our institutional limitations in accurately predicting the 
effect that jurisdictional rules will have on judicial 
economy—an interest that is particularly important in the 
grand jury context.  For these reasons, we decline to exercise 
jurisdiction over this ancillary procedural issue. 
IV. Merits 
A. 
“Though they both operate to protect information from 
discovery, the work-product doctrine and the attorney-client 
privilege serve different purposes.”  In re Chevron Corp., 633 
F.3d 153, 164 (3d Cir. 2011).  The attorney-client privilege 
protects from disclosure confidential communications made 
between attorneys and clients for the purpose of obtaining or 
providing legal assistance to the client.  In re Teleglobe 
Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 359 (3d Cir. 2007); accord 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 68 
(2000).  Although such communications may be both relevant 
Crime-Fraud Exception: Quantum of Proof 
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and highly probative of the truth, we shield them from 
production in order “to encourage full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients and 
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of 
law and administration of justice.”  Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).   
The work product doctrine, in contrast, “promotes the 
adversary system by enabling attorneys to prepare cases 
without fear that their work product will be used against their 
clients.”  In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d at 164 (quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  It “protects from discovery 
materials prepared or collected by an attorney ‘in the course 
of preparation for possible litigation.’” In re Grand Jury 
Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1228 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 505 (1947)).   
Despite their importance, the protections afforded by 
the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine are 
not absolute.  The Supreme Court has explained that the 
crime-fraud exception is one limit on the scope of the 
protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege.   
The attorney-client privilege must 
necessarily protect the 
confidences of wrongdoers, but 
the reason for that protection—the 
centrality of open client and 
attorney communication to the 
proper functioning of our 
adversary system of justice—
ceases to operate at a certain 
point, namely, where the desired 
advice refers not to prior 
wrongdoing, but to future 
wrongdoing.   
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United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562–63 (1989) 
(quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted).  We 
have held that this exception also applies to the work product 
doctrine.  “The work product privilege is perverted if it is 
used to further illegal activities as is the attorney-client 
privilege, and there are no overpowering considerations in 
either situation that would justify the shielding of evidence 
that aids continuing or future criminal activity.”  In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979). 
To circumvent these privileges under the crime-fraud 
exception, the party seeking to overcome the privilege—in 
this case, the Government—“must make a prima facie 
showing that (1) the client was committing or intending to 
commit a fraud or crime, and (2) the attorney-client 
communications were in furtherance of that alleged crime or 
fraud.”  In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d at 217 
(citations omitted).  The “prima facie” standard is drawn from 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Clark v. United States, 289 
U.S. 1 (1933).   
There are early cases apparently 
to the effect that a mere charge of 
illegality, not supported by any 
evidence, will set the confidences 
free.  But this conception of the 
privilege is without support in 
later rulings.  It is obvious that it 
would be absurd to say that the 
privilege could be got rid of 
merely by making a charge of 
fraud.  To drive the privilege 
away, there must be something to 
give colour to the charge; there 
must be prima facie evidence that 
it has some foundation in fact.  
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When that evidence is supplied, 
the seal of secrecy is broken. 
Id. at 15 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
While there is general agreement on these precepts, 
courts of appeals are divided as to the appropriate quantum of 
proof necessary to make a prima facie showing.  This is not 
surprising.  “‘Prima facie’ is among the most rubbery of all 
legal phrases; it usually means little more than a showing of 
whatever is required to permit some inferential leap sufficient 
to reach a particular outcome.”  In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1228 (8th ed. 2004); McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).   
When the Supreme Court last addressed the crime-
fraud exception, it did little to clarify the necessary 
evidentiary showing.  Because it is difficult to determine 
whether a document contains communications used in 
furtherance of a crime or fraud, courts sometimes review the 
allegedly privileged materials in camera to decide whether 
the crime-fraud exception applies to preclude the privilege.  
The Supreme Court affirmed the permissibility of that 
practice in Zolin so long as there is independent evidence 
“sufficient to support a reasonable belief that in camera 
review may yield evidence that establishes the exception’s 
applicability.”  491 U.S. at 574–75.  The Court indicated that 
this is a “lesser evidentiary showing” than is “required 
ultimately to overcome the privilege,” id. at 572, but declined 
to address the amount of proof that is ultimately required, id. 
at 563. 
Courts of appeals have articulated the proper measure 
of proof in different ways.   Some require there to be probable 
cause or a reasonable basis to suspect or believe that the client 
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was committing or intending to commit a crime or fraud and 
that the attorney-client communications were used in 
furtherance of the alleged crime or fraud.  See In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d at 23 & n.4; United States v. 
Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Collis, 128 F.3d 313, 321 (6th Cir. 1997); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1996).  Other courts 
call for evidence sufficient to compel the party asserting the 
privilege to come forward with an explanation for the 
evidence offered against the privilege.  See United States v. 
Boender, 649 F.3d 650, 655–56 (7th Cir. 2011); In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena, 419 F.3d 329, 336 (5th Cir. 2005).  Still other 
courts demand a showing of evidence that, if believed by a 
trier of fact, would establish that some violation was ongoing 
or about to be committed and that the attorney-client 
communications were used in furtherance of that scheme.  
See In re Grand Jury, 475 F.3d 1299, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings #5 Empanelled January 28, 
2004, 401 F.3d 247, 251 (4th Cir. 2005); In re Grand Jury 
Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1226–27 (11th Cir. 1987). 
Our own statement of the proof necessary to apply the 
crime-fraud exception is not particularly helpful.  We have 
consistently expressed the amount of proof required as 
follows: “A ‘prima facie showing’ requires presentation of 
‘evidence which, if believed by the fact-finder, would be 
sufficient to support a finding that the elements of the crime-
fraud exception were met.’”  In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 
F.3d at 217 (quoting Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 
95–96 (3d Cir. 1992)).  This begs the quantum-of-proof 
question because it does not quantify what evidence is 
sufficient.  For example, does the trier of fact have to find that 
there is probable cause to believe a crime or fraud occurred or 
that it is more likely than not a crime or fraud occurred? 
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 The question of what proof we require to overcome 
evidentiary privileges arises in this appeal.  Although the 
District Court cited our traditional “sufficient to support” 
language, it also concluded that the Government had met its 
burden by establishing that there was a “reasonable basis to 
suspect” that ABC Corp. had committed a crime or fraud.  
ABC Corp. urges us to disavow this “reasonable basis to 
suspect” language, which it asserts reflects a far less stringent 
standard than our own “sufficient to support” test, and to 
remand this matter to the District Court so that it can analyze 
whether the Government met its burden under the appropriate 
standard.18
 We have never held, however, that our crime-fraud 
standard was significantly more demanding than the standards 
set out by other courts of appeals.  To the contrary, we have 
cited approvingly the Seventh Circuit Court’s 
pronouncements that a party opposing the privilege meets its 
burden by introducing evidence sufficient to require the party 
asserting the privilege to come forward with an explanation, 
In re Impounded, 241 F.3d at 317 (citing In re Feldberg, 862 
F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1988)), and that “prima facie evidence 
cannot mean ‘enough to support a verdict in favor of the 
person making the claim,’” In re Grand Jury Investigation, 
445 F.3d 266, 275 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Feldberg, 
862 F.2d at 624).  We have also stressed that “[t]he burden is 
not a particularly heavy one,” and that “demonstrating a 
reasonable basis to suspect the perpetration of a crime, if 
based on adequate evidence, satisfies the first prong of the 
crime-fraud exception.”  Id. at 274-75; see also Haines, 975 
F.2d at 95 (approving the District Court’s determination that 
    
                                              
18 We review legal conclusions—such as the amount of proof 
required to apply the crime-fraud exception—de novo.  In re 
Impounded, 241 F.3d 308, 312 (3d Cir. 2001).   
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the “probable cause” formulation and the “sufficient to 
support” standard “amount to the same basic proposition”). 
Today, we clarify that our precedent is properly 
captured by the reasonable basis standard.  The attorney-
client privilege, work product doctrine, and crime-fraud 
exception are all compromises based on policy 
determinations.  Although it is difficult to predict whether a 
particular standard of proof will strike the appropriate balance 
between these competing policy concerns, we believe, as do 
other circuit courts, that the reasonable basis standard affords 
sufficient predictability for attorneys and clients without 
providing undue protection to those that seek to abuse the 
privileges afforded to them.  This is also the standard that we 
believe is closest to the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that, 
for the crime-fraud exception to apply, “there must be 
something to give colour to the charge” that the attorney-
client communication was used in furtherance of a crime or 
fraud.  Clark, 289 U.S. at 15. 
Where there is a reasonable basis to suspect that the 
privilege holder was committing or intending to commit a 
crime or fraud and that the attorney-client communications or 
attorney work product were used in furtherance of the alleged 
crime or fraud, this is enough to break the privilege.  The 
reasonable basis standard “is intended to be reasonably 
demanding; neither speculation nor evidence that shows only 
a distant likelihood of corruption is enough.”  In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d at 23.  At the same time, the party 
opposing the privilege is not required to introduce evidence 
sufficient to support a verdict of crime or fraud or even to 
show that it is more likely than not that the crime or fraud 
occurred.  See id. at 22; In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 
F.3d at 274–75.  The reasonable basis standard is one with 
which courts are familiar, and we are confident that they will 
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be able to apply it consistently to achieve the policy 
objectives of the privileges and the crime-fraud exception. 
Perhaps recognizing that our precedent is amenable to 
the reasonable basis standard articulated by the District Court, 
ABC Corp. asks us to “modify the standard to establish 
crime-fraud by requiring the government to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the privilege has been 
employed to commit a crime or fraud.”  Appellants’ Br. at 60.   
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bourjaily v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), provides some support for use of 
the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.  Federal Rule of 
Evidence 104(a) requires courts to “decide any preliminary 
question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege 
exists, or evidence is admissible.”  In Bourjaily, the Supreme 
Court held that factual predicates needed to determine the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) 
must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.19
Bourjaily, however, does not dictate that we apply a 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in our case.  The 
Supreme Court there was not interpreting the language of 
  
See 483 U.S. at 175–76.  Because Rule 104(a) also applies to 
preliminary factual determinations underlying application of 
the crime-fraud exception, see Zolin, 491 U.S. at 565, it could 
be inferred that the same preponderance standard applies to 
these determinations.   
                                              
19 When Bourjaily was decided, Rule 104(a) provided in 
pertinent part: “Preliminary questions concerning the 
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a 
privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined 
by the court. . . .”  The Rule was amended as part of the 
restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 2011. 
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Rule 104(a) or any other provision of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  Instead, because “[t]he Federal Rules . . . nowhere 
define the standard of proof the court must observe in 
resolving these questions,” the Supreme Court was “guided 
by [its] prior decisions regarding admissibility determinations 
that hinge on preliminary factual questions.”  Bourjaily, 483 
U.S. at 175.  We are guided by the same inquiry here.  
 Neither our own nor Supreme Court precedent 
suggests that a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is 
necessary to protect the policy concerns underlying the crime-
fraud exception.  To the contrary, we have found that these 
policy concerns, which differ from those attending 
evidentiary admissibility, are appropriately protected by a 
lower standard.  This is particularly true in the grand jury 
context, where the need for speed, simplicity, and secrecy 
weighs against imposing a crime-fraud standard that would 
require adversarial hearings or the careful balancing of 
conflicting evidence.20
                                              
20 The Ninth Circuit has held that the preliminary factual 
determinations necessary for application of the crime-fraud 
exception should be determined by a preponderance of the 
evidence in the civil litigation context.  See In re Napster, Inc. 
Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d 1078, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2007), 
abrogated on other grounds by Mohawk, 558 U.S. 100, 130 
S. Ct. 599 (2009).  But that Court made clear that it would 
continue to apply its “reasonable cause” standard to grand 
jury investigations.  Id. at 1094.  We suggest here no view as 
to whether a higher standard should be applied in the civil 
litigation context. 
  See In re Impounded, 241 F.3d at 313 
(“‘Any holding that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials 
and preliminary showings would assuredly impede its 
investigation and frustrate the public’s interest in the fair and 
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expeditious administration of the criminal laws.’” (quoting 
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)); In re 
Napster, 479 F.3d at 1094-95 (“[C]ourts of appeal have noted 
that the need for speed and simplicity at the grand jury stage 
weighs against a crime-fraud standard that requires courts to 
hear testimony or to determine facts from conflicting 
evidence before making a crime-fraud determination.” 
(quotation marks and citations omitted)).  Accordingly, we do 
not adopt a preponderance-of-the-evidence test as the proof 
necessary to apply the crime-fraud exception. 
B. 
ABC Corp. asserts that, regardless of the proof 
required, the District Court erred in determining that the 
Government satisfied its burden.  As just discussed, a party 
seeking to apply the crime-fraud exception must demonstrate 
that there is a reasonable basis to suspect (1) that the privilege 
holder was committing or intending to commit a crime or 
fraud, and (2) that the attorney-client communication or 
attorney work product was used in furtherance of that alleged 
crime or fraud.  We review the District Court’s decision that 
“there is sufficient evidence of a crime or fraud to waive the 
attorney-client privilege” for “abuse of discretion.”  In re 
Impounded, 241 F.3d at 318 (citations omitted).  We review 
factual determinations underlying that decision for clear error.  
Id. at 312.
Crime-Fraud Exception: Satisfaction of Government’s 
Burden  
21
                                              
21 ABC Corp. requests that we change our standard of review 
to de novo for all factual issues underlying application of the 
attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, and crime-
fraud exception.  As the Government points out, and ABC 
Corp. accepts in its Reply Brief, we are bound by our own 
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1. Commission of a Crime or Fraud 
The District Court found that the evidence submitted 
ex parte by the Government provided a reasonable basis to 
suspect that ABC Corp. willfully evaded paying federal 
income taxes in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and engaged in 
a conspiracy to defraud the United States of federal income 
taxes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.22
                                                                                                     
precedent unless it has been overruled by Supreme Court 
decision or we are sitting en banc.  In re Lemington Home for 
the Aged, 659 F.3d 282, 294 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011).  Moreover, 
we voice no opinion on whether the standard of review 
should be changed. 
  This scheme, which 
22 Under 26 U.S.C. § 7201, “[a]ny person who willfully 
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by 
this title or the payment thereof shall . . . be guilty of a 
felony.”  To establish a violation of § 7201, the government 
must prove “(1) willfulness, (2) the existence of a tax 
deficiency, and (3) an affirmative act constituting an evasion 
or attempted evasion of the tax.”  United States v. Hecht, 638 
F.2d 651, 659 (3d Cir. 1981) (Weis, J., dissenting) (citing 
Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965)).  Under 
18 U.S.C. § 371, “[i]f two or more persons conspire to . . . 
defraud the United States . . . and one or more of such persons 
do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be 
fined . . . or imprisoned . . . or both.”  In order to prove a 
conspiracy to defraud the United States, the evidence must 
establish “(1) an agreement to defraud the United States, (2) 
an overt act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of that 
objective, and (3) any conspirator’s commission of at least 
one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States 
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occurred between 2004 and 2006, unfolded in two phases.  In 
the acquisition phase, ABC Corp. acquired the stock of 
closely held companies.  The target companies generally had 
large cash accounts, few or no tangible assets, and 
considerable tax liabilities.  In the disposition phase, ABC 
Corp. would remove significant amounts of the target 
companies’ cash assets, transfer the stock of the target 
companies to two limited liability companies, and engage in 
various transactions that had the effect, it is alleged, of 
fraudulently eliminating the target companies’ tax liability.  
Having done so, John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 would then 
divert the target companies’ cash assets to themselves and 
their family members.   
Our discussion of the District Court’s findings is 
necessarily abridged because of the secrecy of grand jury 
proceedings.  As noted, we received unredacted versions of 
the District Court’s March and June Orders and ex parte 
submissions from the Government.  Having reviewed these 
materials, we cannot say that the District Court’s detailed 
factual findings constituted clear error or that it abused its 
discretion in determining that there was a reasonable basis to 
suspect that ABC Corp. was engaged in a criminal scheme.23
                                                                                                     
v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 238 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing United 
States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1989)).   
   
23 ABC Corp. argues that the District Court erred in declining 
to hold a hearing and in refusing to require the Government to 
disclose some or all of its ex parte submissions to ABC Corp.  
Because grand juries are investigative rather than adversarial 
bodies, and because of the need for secrecy, we have 
generally held that district courts have considerable discretion 
to select among “various avenues of inquiry” in the grand 
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ABC Corp. cites four recent decisions of the United 
States Tax Court in support of its assertion that the District 
Court mistakenly found that the Government satisfied its 
burden in establishing that ABC Corp. committed a crime or 
fraud.  See Slone v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1265 (2012); 
Frank Sawyer Trust v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 623 
(2011); Starnes v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1283 (2011), 
                                                                                                     
jury context.  In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d at 219; 
see also id. (“We today join the ranks of our sister circuits in 
holding that it is within the district courts’ discretion, and not 
violative of due process, to rely on an ex parte government 
affidavit to determine that the crime-fraud exception applies 
and thus compel a target-client’s subpoenaed attorney to 
testify before the grand jury.”); In re Grand Jury Empaneling 
of Special Grand Jury, 171 F.3d 826, 833-34 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(“Neither Supreme Court precedent nor our prior decisions 
require that a hearing be held whenever a subpoena is 
challenged on reasonableness grounds.  Indeed, this court has 
specifically rejected any such suggestion, leaving the decision 
to hold a hearing to the district court’s discretion.”).  The 
District Court refused to require the Government to disclose 
its ex parte submissions because they contained secret grand 
jury information and declined to hold a hearing because the 
Court did not think it would be useful given the parties’ 
divergent access to the relevant evidence.  Instead, it granted 
ABC Corp. access to redacted versions of the Government’s 
briefing, provided ABC Corp. with the opportunity to make 
its own submissions, and conducted a careful and probing in 
camera review of the parties’ evidentiary submissions.  We 
cannot say that the Court abused its discretion, or denied 
ABC Corp. due process, in determining the applicability of 
the crime-fraud exception on this basis. 
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aff’d, 680 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2012); Griffin v. Comm’r, 101 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1274 (2011).  In each of these cases, the Tax 
Court held that company shareholders were not liable for tax 
deficiencies incurred by their respective companies after they 
were sold to third parties.  ABC Corp. argues that it is in the 
same position as the selling shareholders in Slone, Frank 
Sawyer Trust,  Starnes, and Griffin, and thus cannot be 
responsible for the allegedly fraudulent transactions that 
occurred after it sold the target companies. 
We do not agree that these decisions preclude 
application of the crime-fraud exception.  As an initial matter, 
the District Court and the Tax Court applied different 
statutory provisions in distinct contexts.  The latter 
determined whether the shareholders could be held liable as 
transferees under 26 U.S.C. § 6901—which requires 
application of substantive state law—for tax deficiencies 
incurred after the sale of the relevant company.  The District 
Court, in contrast, analyzed whether there was a reasonable 
basis to suspect that ABC Corp. willfully evaded paying 
federal income taxes in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and 
engaged in a conspiracy to defraud the United States of 
federal income taxes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.   
In addition, the Tax Court’s decisions depended on 
fact-specific analyses—which included detailed reviews of 
the transactions at issue, the roles of the shareholders, and 
their knowledge of the fraudulent transactions.  We are 
limited in our ability to discuss the facts of the alleged 
criminal scheme that the grand jury is investigating.  But it 
will not disclose too much for us to say that the Government’s 
submissions provide sufficient support for the inference that 
ABC Corp. played a considerably different role in the alleged 
criminal scheme than the shareholders in Slone, Frank 
Sawyer Trust,  Starnes, and Griffin played in those 
transactions. 
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2. Use of Attorney Advice in Furtherance of the 
Crime or Fraud 
On the basis of its crime-fraud finding, the District 
Court ordered the three in-house counsel to answer all 
questions concerning transactions involving companies that 
ABC Corp. purchased and subsequently transferred to the two 
limited liability companies implicated in the alleged criminal 
scheme.24
We do not think that the District Court’s factual 
findings were clear error or that it abused its discretion in 
determining that there is a reasonable basis to suspect that 
ABC Corp. used the legal advice it obtained in connection 
with these transactions to further its criminal scheme.  For the 
crime-fraud exception to apply, the attorney does not have to 
be implicated in the crime or fraud or even have knowledge 
of the alleged criminal or fraudulent scheme.  In re Grand 
Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d at 279 n.4.  All that is necessary 
is that the client misuse or intend to misuse the attorney’s 
  Although the fraudulent tax transactions took 
place in the disposition phase, the District Court determined 
that the acquisition phase was also an essential component of 
the alleged criminal scheme.  The alleged purpose of the 
criminal enterprise was to divert large sums of money to John 
Doe 1, John Doe 2, and their relatives.  Acquiring cash-rich 
targets with large tax liabilities was therefore a necessary 
precursor to achieving that objective.  Accordingly, the 
District Court ordered the in-house counsel to answer 
questions regarding all phases of the transactions. 
                                              
24 The District Court also determined that the crime-fraud 
exception vitiated any privilege ABC Corp. had over a 2004 
opinion letter that ABC Corp. obtained from outside counsel.  
The District Court’s ruling with respect to this document is 
addressed below.  See infra Part IV.D.1. 
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advice in furtherance of an improper purpose.  Id. at 279–80.  
When this occurs, the purpose of the privilege, to promote the 
fair administration of justice, has been undermined and the 
privilege no longer applies.  Id.    
The District Court found that there is a reasonable 
basis to suspect that ABC Corp. was engaged in a large-scale 
criminal scheme that consisted of multiple phases.  Although 
ABC Corp. suggests that there is no evidence implicating its 
former in-house counsel in the allegedly fraudulent 
transactions that occurred in the disposition phase of the 
scheme, because it is the criminal intent of the client and not 
its attorneys that matters, it is irrelevant whether the in-house 
counsel were only engaged in the scheme’s initial phases.  If 
the acquisition phase was a critical component of the criminal 
enterprise (as the District Court found), any legal advice that 
ABC Corp. obtained to further those acquisitions was used 
for an improper purpose and is not entitled to any protection 
otherwise afforded by the attorney-client privilege or work 
product doctrine.   
In an effort to undermine the District Court’s rulings, 
ABC Corp. asserts that it presented evidence to the District 
Court demonstrating that the in-house counsel’s legal services 
were not used in furtherance of any crime or fraud.  
Specifically, ABC Corp. points to sworn declarations of one 
of the in-house counsel and John Doe 1 purportedly 
“demonstrat[ing] that there were no circumstances where 
[ABC Corp.] consulted an attorney and then engaged in a  
course of action that was fraudulent or criminal.”  Appellants’ 
Br. at 65.   
These declarations do not alter our conclusion that the 
District Court did not commit reversible error.  Although the 
in-house counsel testified that he provided a variety of legal 
services for ABC Corp. in connection with its acquisition of 
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closely held corporations, he did not indicate one way or the 
other whether he believed these transactions were part of a 
larger criminal scheme.  In any event, even if he were entirely 
ignorant of such a scheme, this would not put the crime-fraud 
exception out of play.   
The declaration of John Doe 1 is equally unpersuasive.  
He testified that, to the best of his knowledge, information, 
and belief, ABC Corp. never sought advice from an attorney 
that was then used to commit a crime or a fraud.  While this 
evidence is not necessarily irrelevant, the District Court was 
hardly required to credit this bald statement of innocence 
from a grand jury subject or to determine that it outweighed 
the substantial evidence submitted by the Government.   
C. 
ABC Corp. asserts that even if the District Court was 
correct in applying the crime-fraud exception to strip the 
protection conferred by the attorney-client privilege, the 
exception does not affect the cover conferred by the work 
product doctrine because there is no evidence that the 
attorneys knew of the alleged criminal scheme.   
Application of Crime-Fraud Exception to the Work 
Product Doctrine 
We have left open the possibility that “there may be 
circumstances in which [an] attorney, without knowledge of 
his client’s illegal activity, might . . . properly claim and 
prevail in asserting a work product privilege” even when his 
client cannot.  In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d at 802 
n.5.  Because the work product doctrine protects the interests 
of attorneys separately from the interests of clients, there is at 
least some basis for the proposition that an innocent attorney 
should be able to prevent disclosure of work product that his 
client used to further a crime or fraud.  Accordingly, other 
courts of appeals have afforded attorneys this protection in 
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appropriate circumstances.  See, e.g., In re Green Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 492 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 2007); In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings #5, 401 F.3d at 252–53.  
We continue, however, to leave for another day 
whether we should join these courts.  None of the in-house 
counsel has appealed the District Court’s June Order.  Indeed, 
the in-house counsel would likely need to disobey that Order 
for us to have jurisdiction over their purported work product 
claims.  In the absence of their doing so, we cannot properly 
assess the existence and parameters of their independent 
interests in resisting disclosure of information. 
D. 
ABC Corp. challenges the District Court’s rejection of 
its privilege claims with respect to five documents in the 
possession of ABC Corp.’s former in-house counsel.  As 
noted, we review legal issues underlying the application of 
the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine de novo 
and review factual findings underlying the application of 
these privileges for clear error.  In re Chevron Corp., 633 
F.3d at 161.  
The District Court’s Document Rulings 
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1. Two Copies of Opinion Letter Prepared by ABC 
Corp.’s Outside Counsel 
This document is a 2004 opinion letter prepared by 
ABC Corp.’s outside counsel relating to the allegedly 
fraudulent transactions investigated by the grand jury.  Two 
of the in-house counsel are in possession of this document.  
The only difference between the copies in their possession is 
that one includes handwritten notes.  The District Court 
determined that any protection afforded by the attorney-client 
privilege or work product doctrine to the opinion letter was 
extinguished by the crime-fraud exception.   
ABC Corp. raises two challenges to this ruling.  First, 
it argues that the District Court erred in reversing its previous 
ruling rejecting the Government’s claim that the opinion letter 
was used in furtherance of the alleged tax crimes.  In its 
March Order, the Court ruled that the Government failed to 
carry its burden of introducing prima facie evidence that the 
opinion was used in furtherance of the alleged tax crimes.  
Specifically, the Court found there was no evidence that the 
letter was scripted to provide ABC Corp.’s principals with 
legal support to defend the allegedly fraudulent transactions if 
they were later questioned by the authorities.  In its June 
Order, the Court changed its ruling on the basis of evidence 
newly obtained by the Government—an interview 
memorandum it submitted ex parte and under seal.  Though 
we are unable to discuss the content of this witness summary, 
we have reviewed it and see no abuse of discretion in the 
Court’s determination that it provides a reasonable basis to 
suspect that ABC Corp. used the legal advice contained in the 
opinion letter to further the alleged criminal tax scheme.    
Second, ABC Corp. claims that the handwritten notes 
on one of the copies of the opinion letter should be protected 
from disclosure as attorney work product because no 
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evidence exists implicating the author of the note—
presumably the counsel—in the alleged criminal scheme.  As 
ABC Corp. never raised this issue before the District Court, it 
has waived the opportunity to raise it on appeal.  See United 
States v. Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 430 (3d Cir. 2007); Franki 
Found. Co. v. Alger-Rau & Assocs., Inc., 513 F.2d 581, 586 
(3d Cir. 1975).  Moreover, as we have already noted, the in-
house counsel have not appealed the District Court’s June 
Order.   
2. Email Chain Containing Communications Between 
ABC Corp.’s Outside Counsel and a Target 
Company’s Outside Counsel 
This document is an email chain.  The first message in 
the chain is between outside counsel representing ABC Corp. 
and outside counsel representing one of the target companies 
it purchased.  In this message, counsel for the target company 
(1) asks where to transfer certain business records, including 
records pertaining to patents, of the target corporation, (2) 
asserts that the target company was not required to undertake 
any maintenance responsibilities related to those patents, and 
(3) inquires whether outside counsel prepared a transaction 
binder related to the purchase.  The second message in the 
chain is between ABC Corp.’s outside counsel and one of 
ABC Corp.’s former in-house counsel.  In that message, the 
outside counsel forwards the first email with the request to 
“[p]lease see . . . email below.  Per my voicemail, please 
advise me as to what you would like us to do.”  Because the 
in-house counsel was no longer employed by ABC Corp., the 
remainder of the chain consists of communications discussing 
with whom at ABC Corp. the outside counsel could 
communicate about the matter.  The District Court 
determined that none of these communications was protected 
by the attorney-client privilege. 
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As we have explained, that privilege 
applies to any communication that 
satisfies the following elements: it 
must be “(1) a communication (2) 
made between privileged persons 
(3) in confidence (4) for the 
purpose of obtaining or providing 
legal assistance for the client.” 
“Privileged persons” include the 
client, the attorney(s), and any of 
their agents that help facilitate 
attorney-client communications or 
the legal representation.  
In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 359 (quoting Restatement (Third) 
of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 68, 70 (2000)).25
                                              
25 See also In re Impounded, 241 F.3d at 316 n.6 
(“Communications are protected under the attorney-client 
privilege when: (1) legal advice of any kind is sought (2) 
from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) 
the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in 
confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his insistence 
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by 
the legal advisor, (8) except the protection [may] be waived.” 
(citation omitted)). 
  “To the 
extent that the record is ambiguous as to the elements which 
are necessary to establish the claim of privilege, ‘the burden 
of proving that the attorney-client privilege applies is placed 
upon the party asserting the privilege.’”  In re Grand Jury 
Empanelled February 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 
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1979) (alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Landof, 
591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978)).   
The second email in the chain contains the only 
communication that is arguably privileged.  According to 
ABC Corp., this email “plainly involves a request for legal 
advice” because “one attorney is asking the other attorney 
how to prepare for one of the acquisitions at issue.”  
Appellants’ Reply at 27 (Sept. 10, 2012).  We disagree.  It is 
at best ambiguous whether the communication is a request for 
legal advice (e.g., how ABC Corp. wants to respond to the 
target company’s assertion that it is not responsible for 
maintaining certain patents) or is a purely administrative 
request (e.g., where the business records should be transferred 
and whether a binder has been made).  Because ABC Corp. 
bears the burden of demonstrating that the privilege applies, 
and it has provided no support for its assertion that this was a 
request for legal advice, we cannot say that the District Court 
erred in finding that this email lacks a privilege protection. 
3. Two Documents Containing Communications 
Between John Doe 1 and ABC Corp.’s In-House 
Counsel 
These documents contain communications between 
one of ABC Corp.’s former in-house counsel and John Doe 1 
pertaining to matters involving the wind-up of ABC Corp.’s 
affairs.  ABC Corp. argues that they “do not pertain to any 
specific transaction engaged in by [ABC Corp.] during its 
operations and therefore cannot be considered to be in 
furtherance of any crime or fraud.”  Appellants’ Br. at 72.  
Whatever the merits of this argument, the District Court did 
not order disclosure of the documents on the basis of its 
crime-fraud ruling, but rather because of its determination 
that the communications do not contain legal advice protected 
by the attorney-client privilege.  ABC Corp. does not make 
52 
 
any argument why this ruling was incorrect, and, even absent 
this waiver, we see none.  We accordingly affirm the District 
Court’s ruling as to these two documents. 
V. Conclusion 
We summarize our holdings.   
1.  ABC Corp. has standing to contest the grand jury 
subpoenas because it claims privilege in the sought-after 
documents and testimony.  John Doe 1 and John Doe 2, in 
contrast, lack standing because they are not privilege holders, 
and do not have any other legally cognizable interest in the 
documents or testimony.   
2.  Even though ABC Corp. has standing, we lack 
jurisdiction to hear its appeal from the March Order because 
ABC Corp. may travel the well-worn contempt path to 
jurisdiction.  If ABC Corp. wishes to appeal this Order 
immediately, it must take possession of its documents from 
Blank Rome, refuse to produce them to the Government, and 
appeal any resulting contempt sanctions.  Because the parties 
have been unable to agree on a mechanism for transferring 
the documents, we lift the stay to allow the District Court to 
effect an appropriate transfer.  In doing so, the Court, if it 
wishes, may designate a representative of ABC Corp. to 
receive delivery of the documents or direct ABC Corp. to do 
so.   
3.  We have jurisdiction to hear the appeal by ABC 
Corp. from the June Order because that Order is not directed 
to it and its former employees are unlikely to risk contempt 
sanctions on its behalf.  Contrary to the Government’s 
suggestion, we decline to hold that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 
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100, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009), precludes Perlman appeals by 
grand jury subjects. 
4.  Finally, in reaching the merits of ABC Corp.’s 
appeal from the June Order, we hold that the Court correctly 
(a) applied the crime-fraud exception to deny ABC Corp. a 
privilege protection over testimony and two documents 
sought from its former in-house counsel and (b) determined 
that three documents sought from those counsel do not 
qualify as privileged. 
In this context, we dismiss the appeals by John Doe 1 
and John Doe 2 for lack of standing, dismiss the appeal by 
ABC Corp. from the March Order for lack of jurisdiction, and 
affirm the June Order.26
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
26 For the sake of judicial economy, we have directed the 
Clerk to assign to this panel any further appeals in this matter. 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part.  
 
I agree with the majority that John Doe 1 and John 
Doe 2 lack standing to challenge on the basis of the attorney-
client privilege or work product doctrine the District Court’s 
disclosure orders, because neither individual can claim the 
protection of either exemption from disclosure.  I also agree 
that we lack jurisdiction to review the District Court’s March 
2012 Order (the “March Order”) to the extent that it requires 
production directly by ABC Corporation (“ABC”), because 
ABC may obtain appellate jurisdiction over that portion of the 
March Order by refusing to produce the contested documents 
and standing in contempt. 1
                                                 
1 ABC argues that the District Court included ABC in 
its order by mistake and that the District Court intended to 
require production only by the law firms.  I agree with the 
majority, however, that if ABC wishes to make this argument 
on appeal, it must first stand in contempt. 
  I also am in complete accord with 
the majority’s holdings that we do have jurisdiction over 
ABC’s appeal from the District Court’s June 2012 Order (the 
“June Order”), which compels former in-house counsel of 
ABC to produce certain documents claimed to be protected 
from disclosure by ABC because the former in-house lawyers 
have no stake in the controversy sufficient to prompt them to 
risk contempt of court sanctions, and the only recourse 
available to ABC is a direct appeal of the June Order.  
Finally, I agree that the District Court correctly applied the 
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege in 
ordering production of certain documents by former in-house 
counsel.  I write separately, however, because I believe that 
we have jurisdiction over ABC’s appeal from the March 
2 
 
Order to the extent that it requires production by ABC’s 
outside lawyers – Blank Rome LLP (“Blank Rome”) and 
LaCheen, Wittels & Greenberg, LLP (“LaCheen Wittels”).  I 
would instead reach the merits of both Orders, and I would 
affirm the District Court to the extent it ordered production of 
the documents in question by both outside and former in-
house counsel.  
 
I. Jurisdiction 
 
A. The Perlman Doctrine 
 
As discussed in the majority’s opinion, a witness 
ordered to produce documents before a grand jury may not 
ordinarily bring an interlocutory appeal challenging the order 
requiring production.  See In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 800 (3d Cir. 1979).  To obtain 
review, the witness must instead stand in contempt and appeal 
the contempt order.  Id.   
 
The Supreme Court, however, carved out an exception, 
known as the Perlman doctrine, permitting privilege holders 
to bring interlocutory appeals of orders requiring production 
by third-party custodians.  See Perlman v. United States, 247 
U.S. 7, 15 (1918); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Cianfrani), 563 F.2d 577, 580 (3d Cir. 1977); In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d at 800; In re Grand 
Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 1076-77 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Grand 
Jury, 286 F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 2002).  The Perlman 
doctrine rests on the premise that a non-subpoenaed privilege 
holder does not have the option of standing in contempt to 
obtain jurisdiction over an order directing production by a 
third-party custodian, because the order is not directed to the 
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privilege holder.  See In re Grand Jury (C. Schmidt & Sons, 
Inc.), 619 F.2d 1022, 1024-25 (3d Cir. 1980); In re Grand 
Jury, 111 F.3d at 1077.  Moreover, a third-party custodian in 
possession of subpoenaed documents will more likely comply 
with a district court’s order than stand in contempt to protect 
the privilege holder’s rights.  See In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (Cianfrani), 563 F.2d at 580.  Because the 
privilege holder cannot stand in contempt or force the third-
party custodian to stand in contempt, the privilege holder 
becomes effectively “powerless to avert the mischief of the 
[district court’s] order.”  Perlman, 247 U.S. at 13.  To prevent 
this result, we have held that a district court order requiring 
production by a third-party custodian is final as to the 
privilege holder, and permit the privilege holder to take 
immediate appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See In re 
Grand Jury (C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc.), 619 F.2d at 1025 
(“[W]hen a party, other than the one to whom a subpoena has 
been addressed, moves to quash the subpoena, the denial of 
his motion disposes of his claim fully and finally.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 
Applying the logic of Perlman to this appeal, I agree 
with the majority that ABC cannot appeal the portion of the 
District Court’s March Order requiring ABC itself to produce 
the documents directly.  ABC is an ordinary subpoenaed 
party, rather than a privilege holder challenging production by 
a third-party, with respect to the portion of the District 
Court’s March Order requiring that it produce certain 
documents.  It must therefore stand in contempt to confer 
jurisdiction over this part of the District Court’s order.  See In 
re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d at 800. 
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In my view, however, the portions of the District 
Court’s March Order requiring production by the law firms 
are a different matter.  With respect to the portions 
concerning the law firms, ABC is the purported privilege 
holder challenging a district court order requiring production 
by third-party custodians.  ABC cannot stand in contempt of 
the District Court’s order as to the law firms, because that 
part of the order is not directed to ABC.  See In re Grand Jury 
(C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc.), 619 F.2d at 1024-25.  ABC is thus 
more or less in the same position as were the privilege holders 
in the long line of cases in which we have applied the 
Perlman doctrine – ABC’s only effective recourse is a direct 
appeal of the order requiring third-party custodians to 
produce purportedly privileged records.  Indeed, I see no 
meaningful distinction between the March and June Orders to 
the extent that they both compel production of purportedly 
privileged documents in the custody of parties other than 
ABC.  
 
B. Effect of the Order Against ABC Corporation  
 
The majority distinguishes this appeal principally on 
the grounds that both the law firms and ABC are subject to 
the District Court’s order requiring production.  Therefore, in 
the majority’s view, ABC can obtain immediate appellate 
review by demanding that the law firms return the documents 
to it and by incurring a contempt sanction.  The majority’s 
argument rests, in part, on its assertion that if ABC can appeal 
under Perlman, then any client will be able to bring an 
interlocutory appeal by giving its documents to its law firm. 
 
I cannot agree with the majority’s logic.  The purpose 
of the Perlman doctrine is to enable a privilege holder to 
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appeal an order requiring production when he or she “‘lacks 
the opportunity to contest the subpoena by disobedience 
because it is not directed to him or her.’”  In re Grand Jury, 
111 F.3d at 1077 (quoting In re Grand Jury Matter (Dist. 
Council 33 Health & Welfare Fund), 770 F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 
1985)).  That is exactly the situation that we now face with 
respect to the orders compelling production of the contested 
documents by the law firms.  Because Blank Rome, rather 
than ABC, has physical custody of the documents, ABC 
cannot unilaterally stand in contempt.  Regardless of ABC’s 
intent to stand in contempt, Blank Rome can comply with the 
District Court’s order and produce the documents.  
 
I disagree that ABC has the option of obtaining 
jurisdiction by taking physical custody of the documents and 
refusing to produce them to the Government.  Although the 
majority rules out the possibility of the Government charging 
the law firms with obstruction of justice, it cannot rule out the 
possibility that the District Court will hold the law firms in 
contempt.  The Government subpoenaed the law firms 
individually and moved to compel them to produce the 
documents.  The District Court issued an order requiring 
production by the law firms directly.  Transferring the 
documents to ABC will not negate the law firms’ duty to 
comply with the District Court’s order.  See Couch v. United 
States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 n.9 (1973) (“The rights and 
obligations of the parties bec[o]me fixed when [a] summons 
[is] served, and [a post-summons document] transfer [does] 
not alter them.”) (citations omitted); In re Grand Jury 
Empanelled, 597 F.2d 851, 865 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that 
an employer cannot defeat a subpoena served on its employee 
by taking the requested documents from the employee and 
claiming that the documents are no longer in the employee’s 
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possession); United States v. Asay, 614 F.2d 655, 660 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (stating that a recipient of a summons cannot 
defeat the summons by relinquishing possession of the 
requested documents); United States v. Three Crows Corp., 
324 F. Supp. 2d 203, 206 (D. Me. 2004) (“[T]he law does not 
allow a custodian of records to send [the requested 
documents] away after receiving a summons and then claim 
he cannot produce them, because they are no longer in his 
possession.”).  Accordingly, if the law firms ignore the 
District Court’s order and instead turn over the documents to 
ABC, they will be just as much in contempt as ABC.  See 
Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385, 392 (1957) (“[A] 
criminal contempt is committed by one who, in response to a 
subpoena calling for corporation or association records, 
refuses to surrender them when they are in existence and 
within his control.”) (citations omitted); Fed. R. Crim. P. 
17(g) (“The court . . . may hold in contempt a witness who, 
without adequate excuse, disobeys a subpoena issued by a 
federal court in that district.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) 
(authorizing civil contempt sanctions when “a witness . . . 
refuses without just cause shown to comply with an order of 
the court to testify or provide other information”). 
 
This matter was returned to the District Court with the 
understanding that the parties would be able to reach an 
agreement on a way to transfer the contested documents to 
ABC that would avoid the law firms being found in contempt.   
The inability of the parties to reach agreement on a 
mechanism for the transfer of the documents in question to 
the defunct corporation, coupled with the Government’s 
unwillingness to forego contempt sanctions against the law 
firms, illustrates why jurisdiction should be found to exist in 
relation to the District Court directives requiring production 
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by the law firms.  There is no effective mechanism to avoid 
the problem that Perlman resolves: the release of privileged 
documents by a disinterested custodian who is understandably 
unwilling to suffer contempt sanctions to protect a privilege 
held by another. 
 
The Government’s reluctance to agree to a document 
transfer is not surprising.  The Government wants a 
meaningful contempt sanction, one that threatens an 
individual with imprisonment or hefty monetary penalties.  
But ABC is defunct and no individual has thus far appeared to 
take on the dubious responsibility of suffering contempt to 
protect the attorney-client privilege. 
 
In large measure, the problem presented in this case is 
attributable to the fact that ABC, the privilege holder, is no 
longer active and has no person within the jurisdiction of the 
District Court to whom the documents can be transferred.  It 
is not a sufficient answer to the conundrum created by the fact 
that ABC is defunct to place the matter in the very capable 
hands of the District Court and say you come up with “an 
appropriate mechanism for transferring the documents from 
Blank Rome to ABC Corp.” (Majority Op., typescript at 23.)  
Nor is it sufficient to say that there must be some person who 
has decided to assert the privilege, and that person should be 
designated to receive the documents and suffer contempt 
sanctions.  No such person within the jurisdiction of the 
District Court has yet been identified, and the Government 
certainly would not agree to a transfer of the documents to a 
person who is not subject to the District Court’s jurisdiction.  
It is this inability to identify a person who could be held in 
contempt that makes the Perlman doctrine particularly 
applicable here. 
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Nor does the fact that the law firms are ABC’s agents, 
and thus have a duty to return the documents to ABC upon 
ABC’s demand, alter the result.  Although I agree in general 
that a client can require his or her attorney to return 
documents, I disagree that ABC can do so in light of the 
District Court’s order.  A client generally cannot require his 
or her attorney to violate a district court order to protect his or 
her privilege.  An attorney, after asserting all non-frivolous 
objections to producing client confidences, may ethically 
comply with a court order requiring production.  See Model 
Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(6) & cmt. 13 (2010); Pa. Rules 
of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 19 (2012); see also In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings in Matter of Fine, 641 F.2d 199, 202 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (stating that an attorney may ethically reveal client 
confidences pursuant to a court order).  Because the District 
Court’s order requires the law firms to produce the 
documents, ABC cannot force the law firms to instead return 
the documents to it. 
 
Moreover, I disagree that applying Perlman when the 
privilege holder is also subject to the District Court’s order 
will enable any client to take a Perlman appeal by turning 
over all documents to his or her attorney.  As the majority 
agrees, the Government may request documents by subpoena 
that are subject to the subpoena recipient’s legal control.  See 
In re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d 946, 951 (3d Cir. 1987) (“A 
party’s lack of possession or legal control over documents 
requested by a subpoena is normally a valid defense to a 
subpoena and justification for a motion to quash.”).  As the 
Government appears to agree, a client maintains control over 
documents that he or she turns over to his or her current 
attorney, because the client may ordinarily request the 
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documents’ return.  (Appellee’s Br. 16) (“[T]he subjects [of 
the grand jury investigation] do not suggest that the privilege-
holder corporation no longer has the ability to obtain its 
documents from [its lawyer].”); see also Mercy Catholic Med. 
Ctr. v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 142, 160 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding 
that control under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a) is “the legal right or 
ability to obtain the documents from another source upon 
demand”).  In the majority of future cases, the Government 
will be able to avoid a Perlman appeal by subpoenaing 
records solely from the privilege holder and obligating the 
privilege holder to request his or her attorney to produce the 
documents.  Perlman jurisdiction exists in this instance 
because the Government chose to subpoena the law firms 
directly in possession of the documents, thereby subjecting 
them to possible contempt sanctions should they refuse to 
comply.  
 
I am also concerned that the majority’s rule will 
effectively eviscerate the Perlman doctrine in all instances 
where, as here, the privilege holder can direct the custodian to 
produce the subpoenaed documents, but cannot necessarily 
prevent the custodian from releasing the documents in the 
event a court orders production.  In such cases, the 
Government will have every incentive to subpoena both the 
privilege holder and the custodian, obtain orders against both, 
and use the order against the privilege holder to artificially 
prevent the privilege holder from taking a Perlman appeal.  
Creating such a loophole, in my view, is inconsistent with our 
Court’s interpretation of Perlman as enabling privilege 
holders to obtain jurisdiction when they cannot obtain 
jurisdiction by standing in contempt. 
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Finally, I am constrained to note that this jurisdictional 
puzzle involving a defunct corporation that has been 
subpoenaed to produce documents held by its law firms has 
tied this matter up for months.  Notably, the June Order, 
because ABC is not subject to it, is immediately reviewable 
under Perlman, but the March Order is still unreviewable 
until procedural hurdles are surmounted.  I believe, 
admittedly with the benefit of hindsight, that the Government 
has unwittingly caused a lengthy delay in the grand jury 
proceedings by trying to end-run the Perlman doctrine by 
having both the law firms and ABC be the subjects of the 
disclosure order.  Interests of judicial economy and speedy 
grand jury investigations would have been better served had 
the Government not taken such a belt and suspender approach 
by subpoenaing both the privilege holder and its law firms, 
but instead had directed its subpoena only to the custodians of 
the records and allowed the Perlman doctrine full play with 
an adjudication on appeal of the privilege claims.  
 
C. Effect of Current Representation by the Law Firms 
 
Finally, although not addressed by the majority, the 
Government argues that the Perlman doctrine does not apply 
in this instance because the law firms are not “[d]isinterested 
[t]hird [p]arties” due to their current representation of 
subjects of the grand jury investigation.  (Appellee’s Br. 15.)  
I believe that the Perlman doctrine applies to current 
attorneys and would reject this argument. 
 
As an initial matter, our Court’s interpretation of the 
Perlman doctrine does not require strict disinterest, at least in 
the sense of requiring total non-affiliation with the privilege 
holder.   We have instead tended to focus our analysis on 
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whether the privilege holder “is in a position to control the 
[subpoenaed custodian’s] decision whether to produce the 
records,” and on whether the third-party’s personal stake in 
the matter is substantial enough for it to likely stand in 
contempt to protect the privilege holder’s rights.  In re Grand 
Jury Matter, 802 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1986); see In re Grand 
Jury (C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc.), 619 F.2d at 1024-25 (holding 
that the privilege holder’s employees are third-parties under 
Perlman because employees are unlikely to stand in contempt 
to protect their employer).  Applying this framework, the 
majority and I agree that a privilege holder’s former attorney 
qualifies as a third-party custodian under the Perlman 
doctrine, because a former attorney is not guaranteed to stand 
in contempt to protect his or her former client’s privilege.  
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d at 
800-01.  I believe, as do the majority of other circuits that 
have addressed this issue, that there is no reason to apply a 
different rule to current attorneys.   See, e.g., In re Grand Jury 
Subpoenas, 123 F.3d 695, 699 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[W]e adopt 
the majority rule and apply the Perlman exception to those 
cases wherein a client seeks immediate appeal of an order 
compelling production of a client’s records from his 
attorney.”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings in Matter of Fine, 
641 F.2d at 203 (holding that current attorneys qualify as 
third-parties under Perlman); In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Gordon), 722 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 1983) (“This Court . . . 
joins the majority of other Circuits in applying the Perlman 
exception in those cases wherein a client seeks immediate 
appeal of an order compelling testimony from his attorney.”); 
In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 632 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying the 
Perlman doctrine to current attorneys); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (Malone), 655 F.2d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(“[T]he Perlman exception is available to a client-intervenor 
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when he is appealing an order compelling testimony or 
documents from his attorney.”); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 689 F.2d 1351, 1352 n.1 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(explaining that the Eleventh Circuit is bound by the Fifth 
Circuit’s holding that attorneys are third-parties under 
Perlman).  While a client’s interests may be more closely 
aligned with his or her current attorney than with a former 
attorney, a client cannot control whether his or her attorney 
chooses to stand in contempt.   
 
Moreover, to the extent that current attorneys are 
“interested parties,” they, like former attorneys, are unlikely 
to be so interested that they will stand in contempt to protect 
their client’s privilege.  See In re Grand Jury Proceedings in 
Matter of Fine, 641 F.2d at 203 (“we can say without 
reservation that some significant number of client-intervenors 
might find themselves denied all meaningful appeal by 
attorneys unwilling to” stand in contempt on their client’s 
behalf).  Accordingly, because an attorney need not, and 
probably will not, stand in contempt to protect his or her 
client’s privilege, I believe that our Court’s longstanding 
interpretation of the Perlman doctrine requires finding that 
current attorneys are third-parties. 
 
Additionally, requiring attorneys to stand in contempt 
to enable their clients to appeal unnecessarily fosters conflicts 
of interest between attorneys and their clients.  As the First 
Circuit explained in overruling its prior decision excluding 
attorneys from the Perlman doctrine, requiring attorneys to 
stand in contempt “pits lawyers against their clients” by 
requiring attorneys to choose between protecting their clients’ 
interests and protecting themselves against potentially serious 
contempt sanctions.  In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 123 F.3d at 
13 
 
699 (citing United States v. Edgar, 82 F.3d 499, 507-08 (1st 
Cir. 1996)).  I share the First Circuit’s view that placing 
attorneys in this predicament “hinders the fair representation 
of the client.”  Id. 
 
I am aware that the Ninth Circuit does not ordinarily 
permit Perlman appeals when the custodian is the privilege 
holder’s current attorney.  See, e.g., In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 825 F.2d 231, 237 (9th Cir. 1987) (declining to 
apply the Perlman doctrine when the custodian is the 
privilege holder’s current attorney).  I cannot agree, however, 
with the Ninth Circuit’s logic.  The Ninth Circuit implies that 
a current attorney is more likely to stand in contempt than a 
former attorney, because a current attorney “‘is both subject 
to the control of the person or entity asserting the privilege 
and is a participant in the relationship out of which the 
privilege emerges.’”  Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena 
Served upon Niren, 784 F.2d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 1986)).  This 
reasoning disregards the fact that a privilege holder’s control 
over his or her attorney does not extend to deciding whether 
his or her attorney stands in contempt.  Because the 
custodian’s likelihood of standing in contempt is the relevant 
type of control under the Perlman doctrine, I do not find the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning to be persuasive and would hold 
that we have jurisdiction.   
 
II. Merits 
 
 Instead of dismissing ABC’s appeal of the March 
Order for lack of jurisdiction, I would affirm the District 
Court’s decision on the merits.  For the reasons articulated by 
the majority, I would find that the crime-fraud exception to 
the attorney-client privilege is fully applicable to the 
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documents that are the subject of the March Order.  
Accordingly, I would affirm both the March and the June 
Orders.  
